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Introduction
Mechanisms that have facilitated the recent financial crisis and global economic meltdown have resurfaced concerns (in developing countries) about the positive ambitions of globalization and its implications for growth and volatility (Asongu, 2014a; Kumi et al., 2017) . In fact the crises have brought renewed interest in the heated debate on the advantages of openness policies and their implications for financial development. The issue is particularly tensed in developing countries because according to theoretical postulation, the benefits of liberalization (especially financial openness) are expected to be higher in these countries (Kose et al., 2011) . Accordingly, from a theoretical perspective openness should ease the efficient allocation of resources, promote international risk-sharing, and facilitate institutional and political reforms, inter alia. For instance, as many emerging markets and developing economies (which had to grapple with surges in capital flows earlier in the last decade) are now experiencing a sharp reversal of the flows, many analysts are consistent with the position that the global financial crisis has dramatically unraveled the downsides of openness (Price & Elu, 2014; Batuo & Asongu, 2015; Motelle & Biekpe, 2015) .
The course of the current pattern on openness policies was set in the 1980s with growing cross border financial flows among industrial countries as well as among developing economies. This was facilitated by the liberalization of capital controls in many of these countries because it was highly anticipated that increased cross-border flows would bring more benefits in terms of better capital allocation and improved possibilities of international risk sharing. Accordingly, many economic analysts and policy makers have suggested that these benefits ought to be high for developing countries that have more volatile income growth and relatively scarce capital (Kose et al., 2006) . The narrative on positive effects of openness policies was seriously tarnished by a spade of currency and financial crises in the late 1980s and 1990s. Whereas the debate over the positive gains from trade openness has led to some form of consensus among academics and practitioners (Kose et al., 2006) , that on other openness policies (capital, political and institutional) has intensified and become even more polarized (Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Sung, 2004; Keefer, 2007; Back & Hadenius, 2008) .
Motivated by the goal of giving impetus to economic growth and improving financial development, many African countries embarked on a chain of structural and policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992) . The first generation of reforms consisted of policies that consisted of inter alia: reducing direct government intervention in bank credit decisions, abolishing explicit control on the pricing and allocation of credit, relaxing of control on international capital movements and, allowing of interests rates to be market-determined. The second generation of reforms targeted structural and institutional constraints, notably: improvements in the legal, regulatory, supervisory and institutional environments, restoration of bank soundness and rehabilitation of financial infrastructure . Unfortunately, while a substantial bulk of the literature has assessed financial gains of the reforms (Cho, 1986; Arestis et al., 2002; , not all the dimensions identified by the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank (WB) have been considered (Batuo & Asongu, 2015) 1 .
In the light of the above, this study has a twofold contribution to the literature. First, it complements existing literature by employing the missing financial development dimensions identified by the FDSD of the WB. Second, by adopting a plethora of openness indicators (financial, trade, institutional, political…etc), we present a more dynamic picture of the linkages between openness policies and financial development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical and empirical literature is covered in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis and discussion of results are presented in Section 4 while Section 5 concludes.
Openness, financial development and economic Development: theory and evidence
There is a substantial bulk of theoretical and empirical literature that has investigated linkages between openness, financial progress and economic development. Consistent with Batuo and Asongu (2015) , the principal fundamental underlying financial liberalization is based on a hypothetical connection between financial development and economic prosperity.
Accordingly, it is theoretically anticipated that openness policies will enhance financial development that will eventually lead to a reduction in income inequality and poverty (Odhiambo, 2009 (Odhiambo, , 2011 (Odhiambo, , 2010b (Odhiambo, , 2013 . Seminal contributions on the imperative of openness for financial development (and ultimately economic growth and poverty reduction)
can be traced to the contributions of Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) who advocated that openness policies would stifle repression (i.e. financial, economic, political and institutional) which was a cause of poor growth performance from developing countries. In essence, the theoretical underpinning assumes that more openness policies will increase both domestic and foreign investments that are necessary for domestic financial development, employment, economic growth, public income (needed for social amenities) and reduction of poverty and inequality by means of employment and redistributive public spending. The bulk of literature on the link between the underlying nexuses has been premised on the discussed theoretical underpinning (see Reinhart & Loannis, 2008; Galbis, 1993; Galor & Zeira, 1993; Mckinnon & Pill, 1999; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Demirguc-kunt & Detragiache, 2000; Hellmann et al., 2000; Assefa & Mollick, 2016; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2016) . In what 1 Also see the bulk of recent literature on financial development that has failed to incorporate various dimensions of the FDSD of the World Bank (Fowowe, 2014 : Asongu, 2012 , 2015 Daniel, 2017; Chikalipah, 2017; Wale & Makina, 2017; Osah & Kyobe, 2017; Bocher et al., 2017; Chapoto & Aboagye, 2017; Oben & Sakyi, 2017; Iyke & Odhiambo, 2017) .
follows, we articulate the specific features openness notably: financial liberalisation, trade liberalisation and institutional/political liberalisation. The specifics are substantiated in chronological order.
First, with regard to financial openness, the decision on whether to move to an open economic account (from a closed economic account) has been the subject of much heated debated in the literature (see Asongu, 2017) . Consistent with Asongu and De Moor (2017) , there are two main positions on the importance of capital account openness when it comes to understanding its implications for developing countries. (i) The first position on "allocation efficiency" fundamentally builds on the positive claims on efficient allocation of capital advocated by the neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956 ). In the light of this model, the efficient allocation of international resources is facilitated by capital account liberalization.
Accordingly, the process of capital account liberalization enables the flow of capital resources (which are abundant in rich countries and where the return of capital is low) to capital-scarce poor countries (which are rich in labour and where the return of capital is high). The documented positive externalities from capital account openness include, inter alia: decreased cost of capital, enhanced investment and inclusive growth that are essential in improving living standards (Fischer, 1998; Obstfeld, 1998; Summers, 2000) . It is therefore on the bases of these theoretical advantages that over the past three decades, many developing nations have justified the need to open their capital accounts.
(ii) The second position in the literature simply acknowledges the justification for allocation efficiency as a disguised attempt to extend the rewards from international trade in commodities to international trade in assets. With respect to this strand, the assumption of allocation efficiency can withstand scrutiny only and only if developing countries (with the exception of free capital movements) do not experience macroeconomic volatilities. In the light of the fact that volatilities and distortions were experienced by developing countries during the recent global financial crises, proponents in this strand have advocated that the practical realities of capital account liberalization do not converge with the corresponding hypothetical advantages advanced by the contending strand (see Rodrik, 1998; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009 ). Rodrik (1998) with a provocative title (i.e. "Who Needs CapitalAccount Convertibility?") has concluded that there is no apparent relationship connecting capital account openness to the rate of investment and economic prosperity in developing countries. He goes on further to infer that the cost of financial globalization is obviously dismal for developing countries whereas the benefits from capital account liberalization are not easy to establish. Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) conclude that with the recent financial crises, doubts have increasingly been raised about the rewards of financial engineering. These narratives should be balanced with recent evidence that financial globalization uncertainty is favorable to domestic financial development (see .
Second, the dimension of trade openness is fundamentally traceable to the underpinnings of the Hecksher-Ohlin (HO) theory which predicts that openness to trade will engender more specialisation and rise in income levels for participating countries, owing to positive externalities from comparative advantages, notably: enhanced rational global allocation of production (Batuo & Asongu, 2015) . According to the narrative, with trade liberalisation, countries will switch production to efficient labour-intensive exports, from inefficient capital-intensive import substitutes. In spite of these theoretical positions, the empirical literature on the relevance of trade openness on development outcomes has documented results that run counter to the expected theoretical benefits (Wood, 1995; Bourguignon & Morrison, 1998; Alarcon & McKinley, 1998; Savvides; (Montinola & Jackman, 2002) , S-shaped (Sung, 2004) , or J-shaped (Back & Hadenius, 2008) .
Consistent with the time of exposure hypothesis, Keefer (2007) has demonstrated that younger democracies produce worse institutions than their older counterparts 2 .
(ii) Since developing countries have a more volatile output than advanced industrial countries, it has been argued that the former countries (which completely opened-up their capital accounts) have been more vulnerable to crises, relative to than their industrial counterparts (Kose et al., 2011; Henry, 2007) .
The above narratives point to the fact that the nexus between openness and development outcomes is still open to debate because there is no definite consensus in 2 A substantial bulk of qualitative literature provides exhaustive case studies on how institutional quality decreases with political openness. This is the case with many developing countries in Africa (Lemarchand, 1972; Asongu, 2014b) , Southeast Asia (Scott, 1972) , India (Wade, 1985) and Turkey (Sayari, 1977) . It is also the case of post-communist Russia (Varsee, 1997) and many Latin American countries after waves of democratization (Weyland, 1998) . This contradictory nexus between democracy and institutional quality has been confirmed in quantitative studies (Harris-White & White, 1996; Sung, 2004) .
scholarly and policy circles. In what follows, we contribute to this debate by employing a multitude of openness and financial development variables.
Data and Methodology

Data
We investigate a sample of 28 African countries with annual data from African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank, Chinn and Ito (2002) , Gwartney et al. (2011) and the FDSD for the period 1996 to 2010. Limitations to the number of countries and periodicity of analysis have a twofold justification: (i) constraints in data availability on institutional quality and (ii) the motivation of capturing the effects of second generation financial reforms that targeted institutional and structural constraints.
In line with recent financial development literature (Asongu, 2016) , we use financial dynamics of depth, activity and size. We provide three justifications for these financial measures in appreciating second generation reforms. First, the reforms were also intended to promote the creation of bank accounts so that a considerable chunk of the monetary base could transit via formal financial institutions (financial depth) in order to enhance monetary policy efficiency. Second, the reforms sought to improve financial activity by means of granting credit (financial activity), given the substantially documented issues of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009 ). Third, a corollary of the two objectives above is the improvement of overall financial size. As presented in Appendix 3: financial depth is measured both from overall economic and financial system perspectives, financial activity is appreciated at the banking system and financial system levels while financial size is measured only at the financial system perspective.
Consistent with (ii) The private sector often circumvents capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of regulatory capital controls (Edwards, 1999) . (iii) More recently China's de facto openness, despite its de jure closure has been subject to much discussion in research circles (Prasad & Wei, 2007; Aizenman & Glick, 2009; Shah & Patnaik, 2009 Consistent with Asongu (2014a) , control variables include: inflation, government expenditure, economic prosperity (or GDP growth), human development, foreign aid and population growth. We expect inflation to decrease financial development while economic prosperity and population growth should improve it. Human development should also improve financial development, while the effects of government expenditure and development assistance are contingent on the quality of institutions. Accordingly, government expenditure and development assistance destined for financial sector development may be tainted with corrupt practices. These control variables are consistent with recent financial development literature (Banya, R. & Biekpe, 2017; Biekpe, 2011; Osabuohein & Efobi, 2013; Owosu & Odhiambo, 2014; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2015a , 2015b Adjasi & Biekpe, 2006; Gossel & Biekpe, 2014) .
The summary statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation analysis (depicting nexuses among key variables used in the study) and variables' definitions are presented in the appendices. The "summary statistics" (see Appendix 1) of the variables used in the panel regressions shows that there is quite some variation in the data utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix (which is available upon request) is to mitigate issues resulting from multicollinearity.
From an initial assessment of the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any disturbing issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated. Appendix 2 shows the definitions and corresponding sources of the variables.
Methodology
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Owing to the substantially high correlation among government quality indicators, it is logical to criticize the redundancy of some information. Accordingly, we use principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensions of government-effectiveness, rule of law, regulation quality, corruption-control, voice & accountability and political stability. PCA is a statistical technique that is widely used to reduce a larger set of correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal components (PCs) that account for most of the information in the original data set (Tchamyou, 2016) . The criteria applied to determine how many common factors to retain are from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) . Hence, only
PCs with an eigenvalue greater than one are retained. As presented in Table 1 below, the first PC is appropriate since it has an eigenvalue of 4.705 and represents about 78.4% of information in the institutional indicators combined. The first PC will hence represent the institutional openness index (Instidex). On the other hand, the main disadvantage of a dynamic panel data analysis is the use of data averages or shorter time spans. Consequently, the estimated results depict short-term effects and not long-run impacts, which should be kept in mind when interpreting and discussing estimated results. The redeeming feature however is that, the use of average data mitigates short-run disturbances that may loom substantially large. For robustness purposes we use both two-year and three-year non overlapping intervals (NOI).
Estimation technique
The dynamic panel regression model is as follows:
where 't' stands for the period and 'i' represents a country. FD is financial development; F , financial openness (KAOPEN and FDI)  an error term.
The estimated coefficients from Eq. (1) will be unbiased if and only if the explaining variables exhibit strict exogeneity. However, this is unfortunately not the case for the following reasons. First, while the exogenous variables may have a substantial effect on financial development, the reverse effect could also be applicable. Second, the regressors can be correlated with the error term. Third, country-and time-specific effects are likely to also be correlated with other variables in the model. This is often the case when the lagged dependent variable is included in the equations. In order to tackle the above issues of endogenous regressors, a way of dealing with the problem of the correlation between the individual specific-effects and the lagged dependent variables involves eliminating the individual effects by first differencing. Hence, Eq. (1) becomes:
Despite the elimination of country-specific effects by first differencing, Eq. (2) still presents an important issue. Estimation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is still biased because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous independent variable and the error term. To the address this second concern, we estimate the regression in differences jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. The estimation approach uses lagged levels of the regressors as instruments in the difference equation and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in the level equation. Hence, all the orthogonal conditions between the lagged dependent variables and the error term are exploited. Between the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) , we adopt the latter in accordance with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) 4 .
We use the two-step GMM in specifying the dynamic panel system estimation because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity. The residuals are considered to be homoscedastic in the one-step approach. In addition, it is important to note that the estimation depends on the hypothesis that the lagged values of the dependent variable and other independent variables are valid instruments in the regression. In the case where the error terms of the level equation are not autocorrelated, the first-order autocorrelation of the differenced residuals should be significant while the second-order autocorrelation (AR (2)) should not be. The validity of the instruments is assessed with the Sargan over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test. In summary, the main arguments for using the system GMM estimation are that: it does not eliminate cross-country variation, it mitigates potential biases of the difference estimator in small samples and, it can control for the potential endogeneity of all regressors.
4 "We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) 
. The system estimator exploits an assumption about the initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially consistent with standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our empirical application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent empirical growth research". Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) .
Presentation and discussion of results
Presentation of results
The findings in Table 2 summarize results for financial depth (Table 3) , financial activity (Table 4 ) and financial size (Table 5) . From the summary, the following conclusions could be drawn. First, while the de jure (KAOPEN) measurement of financial openness improves financial depth, the de facto (FDI) measurement decreases it. However the effect of the latter measure is positive for financial size 5 . Second, whereas trade openness also improves financial depth, its effects on financial activity and size are negative. Third, institutional openness has a positive effect on financial dynamics of depth and activity, while its effect on financial size is negative. Fourth, political openness and economic freedom are detrimental to financial dynamics of depth and activity. Five, most of the significant control variables have expected signs: inflation decreases financial development, while government expenditure and economic prosperity increase it, for the most part (Asongu, 2011) . 
Test for AR (2) 
Further discussion of results
This section further discusses the results. First, the positive effect of the de jure Second, increases in trade openness activities (in terms of growing imports and exports) will logically have a positive effect on financial depth by increasing the velocity of money. However the negative incidence of exports on domestic financial activity could be due to the fact that a substantial portion of agricultural export activities are not formally financed by credit from formal financial institutions. This is the case in most rural areas where non-formal and informal financial channels are used to finance the production of cash crops.
Third, apart from a small exception (i.e. financial size), the positive effect of institutional openness on financial development is broadly consistent with the significant role of institutional adjustments for financial development in second generation openness reforms.
Fourth, the negative effect of political openness on financial development is broadly consistent with Asongu (2011) . The time and level hypothetical benefits of democracy (discussed in the introduction) have been confirmed in the literature. Asongu (2014b) has concluded that democracy in Africa has important effects on the degree of competition for public offices but less significant effects in comparison with autocracy on policies of financial development. This essentially because, democracies in the continent are young (time hypothesis) and weak (level hypothesis). Hence, in order for African democracies to reap any government quality benefits, once democracies are initiated, they should be accelerated to edge the appeals of autocracy. This African evidence is in line with broader literature on the level (Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Sung, 2004; Back & Hadenius, 2008) and 'time of exposure' (Keefer, 2007) schools of thought pertaining to the benefits of political openness documented in Southeast Asia (Scott, 1972) , India (Wade, 1985) , Turkey (Sayari, 1977) , post communist Russia (Varsee, 1997), Latin America (Weyland, 1998) and, confirmed in a substantial bulk of quantitative studies (Harris-White & White, 1996; Sung, 2004) . Fifth, we notice that "economic freedom" is detrimental to financial development dynamics of depth and activity. This could be explained from the fact that the substantial weight of its legal structure component is inclined to facilitating financial allocation efficiency (financial activity/financial depth) than to improving the independent components of financial efficiency.
Conclusion and future research directions
This study has assessed dynamics of openness and finance in Africa by integrating financial development dynamics of depth, activity and size in the assessment of how financial, Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing how the established findings withstand empirical scrutiny from country-specific settings. Moreover, assessing how openness modulates the effect of information sharing offices on financial development is worthwhile. This recommendation is timely given the recent introduction of information sharing offices that are designed to reduce information asymmetry for more financial access in the continent Triki & Gajigo, 2014 
